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1 Introduction
¿e persistence of ordinary objects is now a staple topic of contemporary meta-
physics. Given the interest and industry that the debate has attracted, it is surpris-
ing that (contemporary) philosophers have only recently considered in earnest the
impact of relativistic physics on themetaphysics of persistence.1 As we will see, this
omission is now well on course to being rectied.
We have two aims in this paper. ¿e rst is to provide the reader with a crit-
ical guide to this recent work. Much of it investigates whether endurantism can
be sustained in the context of relativity. Several arguments have been advanced
that aim to show that it cannot. We nd these unpersuasive, and will add our own
criticisms to those we review. Our second aim, which complements the rst, is to
demarcate the most defensible form of relativistic endurantism (and similarly, of
perdurantism). A recurring theme of this paper is that even those philosophers
who do worry about relativity have not taken it seriously enough. (Cody Gilmore
and, to some extent, Yuri Balashov are exceptions to this general rule.)
Before turning to these two main tasks, we address a worry that we think some
will have concerning the legitimacy of the project of articulating a relativistically
acceptable version of endurance.
A version of this paper will appear in Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics (2006). Please cite
and quote from the published version.
1Yuri Balashov deserves most credit for placing the topic of persistence in relativity on the
agenda. For earlier discussions, see Quine (1960, 172), and Smart (1972).
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Inmost contemporary discussions, the perdurance–endurance debate is rmly
rooted in a classical (i.e. non-relativistic) world-view. Philosophers who are wary
of metaphysical speculation that fails to take science seriously are likely to take a
dim view of much of the contemporary debate. But equally they might judge the
project of reconstructing relativistic versions of familiar non-relativistic doctrines
to be horriblymisguided. Shouldwe not start with the relativistic world picture and
ask, in that setting and without reference to non-relativistic notions, how things
persist? We have a lot of sympathy for such views, but nonetheless think that it is
worthwhile to engage with attempts to square the familiar doctrines with relativity.
In the case of perdurantism the project is straightforward (although, as we shall
see, the right things have not always been said). As for endurantism, consideration
of a relativistic version is worthwhile for at least two reasons.
First, the published arguments recently oered against relativistic endurantism
do not succeed and it is worth putting on record the true reasons why they fail.
Second, and more signicantly, there is at least a prima facie tension between
the perdurantist account of persisting objects and our experience of such objects.
Our basic experiential grasp of the persistence of objects involves the direct percep-
tion of persistence in single, temporally extended experiences. It is a commonplace
in philosophical discussions of perception that we directly perceive motion, e.g.,
the motion round the dial of the second hand of a watch. But such perceptions are
also direct perceptions of persistence; i.e., of the self-same object (the second hand)
existing at more than one time. ¿e tension with perdurance consists in the fact
that experience does not present this phenomenon as involving numerically dis-
tinct temporal parts of the second hand located at dierent ‘times’.2 ¿is should be
clear when one contrasts the phenomenology of the experience of persistence with
the way in which experience presents a spatially extended object, even one that is
perceptually homogeneous, as having numerically distinct spatial parts at dierent
places. To be spatially extended just is to have numerically distinct parts at distinct
locations; or, at least, that is what experience suggests. A further, perhaps more in-
teresting, contrast is with our auditory perception of words. We hear spoken words
as temporally extended, and do so in virtue of hearing their numerically distinct
constitutive phonemes as located at dierent times. It follows that, despite rela-
tivity in some sense clearly favoring perdurance, it is worth asking whether there
is not some alternative way of conceptualizing persistence that is compatible with
relativity and does better justice to our experience.3
2Which is not to say that experience presents this phenomenon as not involving numerically
distinct temporal parts. ¿is may also be true, but we do not wish to commit ourselves to such a
claim here. ¿anks to John Hawthorne for pressing this point.
3¿is need not be a version of endurantism, as that is understood in this paper. See Simons
(2000) for a non-perdurantist account of the persistence of ordinary objects that might nonetheless
be compatible with an ontology that is perdurantist at a more fundamental level.
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In what follows we show how familiar notions of perdurance and endurance
should be transformed in the light of relativity, and how relativistic endurantism
withstands recent criticisms. Section 2 reviews the standard non-relativistic doc-
trines and considers what revisions taking relativity seriously requires. ¿e ba-
sic elements of relativistically-defensible endurantism and perdurantism are intro-
duced. Section 2 will also enable us to respond to two recent criticisms of relativis-
tic endurantism, one by Yuri Balashov and the other by Steven Hales and Timothy
Johnson. ¿ese we deal with in Sections 3 and 4 respectively.
Section 2 characterizes endurance as involving the multi-location of objects in
spacetime. ¿e exact pattern of this multi-location remains to be explored. In Sec-
tion 5, we consider Gilmore’s discussion of this issue (Gilmore forthcoming). ¿e
most natural of the options Gilmore considers can, we argue, be defended against
his objections. Our discussion suggests, however, that an alternative point of view
is preferable, one that questions the legitimacy of Gilmore’s agenda-setting ques-
tion. ¿is alternative, moreover, provides a useful perspective fromwhich to reject
a nal argument due to Yuri Balashov. We review this argument in Section 6.
2 Taking relativity seriously
¿epersistence debate is but one of three central debates in the philosophy of time.
In addition to the opposition between endurantists and perdurantists there is also
that between eternalists and non-eternalists and that between tensers and detensers.
In contrast to the persistence debate, whether and how relativity impacts upon
these other issues is well-trodden ground.
Eternalism is a doctrine concerning the ontological status of times other than
the present. Just as we take distant places to be no less real than our immediate
spatial locality, so the eternalist holds that all times are ontologically on a par. In
contrast, presentists, for example, hold that only the present is real.
Tensers share the presentists’ belief that the present is special, but they need not
agree that it is ontologically favored. Non-present times might also exist, with the
present somehow being metaphysically special, perhaps because there are tensed
facts. Facts about which events are occurring (present tensed), for example, would
pick out as privileged the time at which those events (tenselessly) occur. Tensers
take (token) tensed utterances to be made true by such tensed facts. In contrast,
the detenser rejects the idea that the present ismetaphysically special. All times are
on a par, period. And just as token utterances involving indexicals such as “here”
and “I” are standardly held to be made true by non-indexical facts, so the detenser
asserts that token utterances of tensed sentences are made true by tenseless facts.4
4For this reason, detenserism is also known as indexicalism (cf.Merricks 1995, 523).
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For some detensers, an utterance at time t of “It is now raining”, for example, is
(tenselessly) true i it is (tenselessly) raining at time t. For others, an utterance of
“It is now raining” is (tenselessly) true i it is (tenselessly) raining simultaneous
with that utterance.
We take it that relativity rules decisively against both the non-eternalist and
the tenser.5 To quote the title of Savitt (2000), “there’s no time like the present
(in Minkowski spacetime).” Both presentism and tensed theories of time need an
objectively privileged set of subregions of spacetime, each of which can serve as
the present as ‘time passes’ (however this is to be interpreted!). Relativistic physics
simply does not provide such a set. Faced with this fact, the tenser can choose to
regard the relativistic picture of the world as simply incomplete: there are, in addi-
tion to the spatiotemporal facts describable in properly relativistic language, facts
about what is present.6 Such a view is clearly logically consistent, but it prompts an
immediate question: are these facts observable? If they are, then relativistic physics
is empirically inadequate. Some philosophers no doubt believe this. ¿ey are likely
to see the experiential phenomena associated with the idea that time passes as ly-
ing outside the scope of relativity. But we believe that there is no good reason to
think that these phenomena cannot be completely explained in (relativistic) tense-
less terms. And we take an eternalist tenseless theory of time to be vindicated if the
tenser’s additional metaphysical facts are unobservable to the extent that even the
nature of our temporal experience fails to constitute evidence for them.
What of endurance? ¿e combination of eternalism and a tenseless theory of
time falls short, by itself, of ruling this out. Endurance involves persisting objects
being wholly present at dierent times. For tenseless eternalists, therefore, en-
durance involves persisting objects existing at multiple times by being tenselessly
and wholly located at these times. But note that the kernel of tenseless eternalism
is that all times are on a par. Since the endurantist is not committed to regarding
any time—any particular temporal location of any particular enduring object—as
special, endurantism and tenseless eternalism are entirely consistent. Of course
anyone who embraces this position must respond to Lewis’ (1986, 202–5) problem
of temporary intrinsics. ¿e endurantist does so by relativizing property instanti-
ation to times.7
One moral of relativity is that there is no privileged present, but since the en-
durantist need not regard any time as privileged, why need more be said? ¿e
answer lies with the reason why a relativistic world does not admit a privileged
5¿e issue is (surprisingly) controversial though. What follows is not intended to persuade
committed non-eternalist tensers. We are merely clarifying our position, which we take to be that
of Saunders (2002).
6See e.g. Prior (1970, 247).
7We will not rehearse the various dierent ways to implement this relativization. An overview
is found in Haslanger (2003).
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present. A er all, nothing in Newtonian physics singles out (now!) a particular
time as ‘the Now’, but the tenser will not judge Newtonian physics to be inadequate
for that reason. ¿e reason why there is no time like the present in Minkowski
spacetime is that, in Minkowski spacetime, there is no time. ¿is, we think, is the
lesson of relativity thatmany philosophers have yet to take fully on board. Itmeans,
clearly, that our characterization of endurance in terms of time-relativized property
instantiation by objects multiply located at dierent timesmust be revised. But so
must the characterizations of eternalism and the tenseless theory of time, for these
too were stated in terms of times. Without modication, relativity is as inimical to
these positions as it is to their rivals.
2.1 Formulating Relativistic Perdurance
¿e required alteration to eternalism is obvious and trivial. Relativistic eternalism
is simply the doctrine that all regions of spacetime are on a par, ontologically and
metaphysically. It is withmany philosophers’ attempts to formulate relativistic ver-
sions of the other positions that we disagree. ¿emost popular strategy, surely, has
been to frame-relativize. ¿is, we contend, is fundamentally wrong-headed. A few
examples will illustrate our point.
Consider Ted Sider’s denition of a temporal part, and his associated denition
of four-dimensionalism (perdurantism):
x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df (1) x exists
at, but only at, t; and (2) x is a part of y at t; and (3) x overlaps at t
everything that is a part of y at t.
. . .Four-dimensionalismmay then be formulated as the claim that,
necessarily, each spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every
moment at which it exists.
¿is all could bemade relativistically acceptable by relativizing the
denition of a temporal part to a frame of reference, and then stating
four-dimensionalism as the claim that for any chosen frame of refer-
ence, every spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at everymoment
of time at which it exists. (Sider 2001, 59)
Note that there are two temporally relativized notions at play here: parthood-at-
a-time and existence-at-a-time. Sider himself prefers an atemporal notion of part-
hood, and oers alternative denitions in terms of it (2001, 56–60). He chooses
to oer denitions in terms of the temporally relativized notion purely because he
thinks that this may be the only notion acceptable to his endurantist opponent;
he is concerned to state four-dimensionalism in a manner that his opponent must
admit is intelligible. Even if we avoid temporally relativized parthood, however,
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temporally relativized existence remains, and is crucial to the denitions framed
in terms of atemporal parthood.
¿e ‘times’ of the denitions simply do not exist in a relativistic world. But what
is wrong with Sider’s response: replace them with the times of inertial frames?8 A
number of things.
First, an ambiguity in the frame-relativized denition needs to be claried. Is
it taken to be a frame-relative matter what temporal parts the object has? (Relative
to frame F the object has one set of temporal parts each existing at, and only at, a
time in F; relative to frame F ′ it has another set, and so on.) Or is the idea that the
object has all of these temporal parts quite independently of whether we consider
things from the point of view of some particular frame of reference?9
It is perhaps obvious that the second of these proposals was intended, but it is
nonetheless worth stating explicitly what is wrong with the rst. It seeks to attach
a metaphysical weight to frames of reference that they simply do not carry. Iner-
tial frames of reference (or, more accurately, spacetime coordinate systems adapted
to them) are no more than the spatiotemporal analogues of Cartesian coordinate
systems. ¿e atness of the spacetime of special relativity means that certain space-
time coordinate systems have a privileged status with respect to the spatiotemporal
distance relations holding between spacetime points. ¿e coordinate dierences
of such points with respect to these special coordinate systems encode, in a direct
manner, the spatiotemporal distances, just as the coordinate dierences in Carte-
sian coordinates encode Euclidean distances.10 But just as no one would attach
ontological weight to features of an object that are relative to a choice of Cartesian
coordinates, so no one should attach signicance to properties of objects that are
essentially dened in terms of canonical frames of reference.
From the physicist’s perspective, the content of spacetime is as it is. One can
choose to describe this content from the perspective of a particular inertial frame
of reference (i.e., to describe it relative to some standard of rest and some standard
8Sider’s treatment is arguably more sophisticated than our chosen quotation suggests. In Sec-
tion 6, we will partly endorse his critique of an anti-endurantist argument by Yuri Balashov.
Nonetheless, there remain vestiges of frame-relativization even in that critique.
9Perhaps there is a third option: it is a frame-independent matter that the object has all such
parts, but it is a frame-dependent matter which proper subset of these parts counts as the set of its
temporal parts. We nd it hard to see what work the honoric “temporal” does on such a view.
10For two spacetime points with coordinates (x , y, z, t) and (x′ , y′ , z′ , t′), the distance be-
tween them is given by
»S(x − x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z − z′)2 − (t − t′)2 S just as, in Euclidean
space, the distance between two points with coordinates (x , y, z) and (x′ , y′ , z′) is given by»(x − x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z − z′)2 . If (x − x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z − z′)2 − (t − t′)2 A 0 the points
are spacelike related (i.e., they are some spatial distance apart). If (x − x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z −
z′)2 − (t − t′)2 < 0 the points are timelike related (i.e., they are some temporal distance apart). If
(x − x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z − z′)2 − (t − t′)2 = 0 the points (assuming they are distinct) are lightlike
related.
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of distant simultaneity that are optimally adapted to the geometry of spacetime
but are otherwise arbitrary). But one can equally choose to describe the contents
of spacetime with respect to some frame that is not so optimally adapted to the
geometric structure of spacetime, or indeed, choose to describe it in some entirely
frame-independent manner.
Second, Sider’s frame-relativized denition tells us that the perduring object
has ‘temporal’ parts located at certain regions of spacetime (subregions of the ‘times’
of inertial frames) within the object’s worldtube. What of the other subregions of its
worldtube? Does it have parts located at these? We do not doubt that Sider answers
armatively. ¿ismay even follow from the principle of unrestricted mereological
composition, to which Sider signs up. But this would be to miss the point that,
from a relativistic point of view, the assumption that a perduring object has parts
at every proper subregion of its worldtube is overwhelmingly natural. Call this
the doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts.11 From a relativistic point of view, it
should be a starting point, not something that falls out from a frame-relative gener-
alization of the non-relativistic notion of a temporal part togetherwith unrestricted
composition. Indeed, from the relativistic perspective, the existence of specically
‘temporal’ parts of an object does not even warrant comment.
¿is last claimmight seem too strong, for, in the non-relativistic context, a per-
during object’s temporal parts perform a vital function. Consider the spatial anal-
ogy. It is not incidental to an object’s spatial extension that it has parts located in
subregions of the region it occupies. One wants to say that it is spatially extended in
virtue of these parts. Likewise, one might say that an object’s having some partic-
ular spatial shape simply consists in its having parts arranged in a particular spatial
conguration. In a similar way, the non-relativistic perdurantist will say that an
object persists (i.e., extends through time) in virtue of having distinct temporal
parts located at each time. Do temporal parts play an analogous role in the context
of relativity? Do they explain how persisting objects succeed in being extended in,
say, timelike directions?
Before answering, we should clarify what might be meant by a relativistic (in-
11Cf. Sattig (2006, 54). It faces the following problem. Objects can be ‘gappy’ if (e.g.) they are
composed of nitelymany pointlike parts standing in nite spatiotemporal distance relations. What
should we take as the worldtube of such an object? If one took the view that the object’s exact
location in spacetime was simply the fusion of the exact, pointlike locations of each of its parts,
then the doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts falls out, but threatens to become a triviality (we
ignore for the time being the possibility of extended simples). But such a denition of a composite
object’s worldtube is, in certain respects, unnatural. Consider the purely spatial case, and an object
composed of interacting pointlike parts whose short-range repulsive forces prevent other objects
from entering a continuous spatial region that contains all the parts of the object. (For example:
consider a table!) Don’t we want to say that such an object occupies a continuous spatial region?
If a more inclusive denition of an object’s worldtube is adopted, then more work is required to
articulate the relativistic intuition that lies behind the doctrine of arbitrary spatiotemporal parts.
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stantaneous) ‘temporal’ part. We have already reviewed Sider’s denition: a tem-
poral part of an object exists at, and only at, a time in some inertial frame, and
overlaps everything that is part of O that exists at that time. ¿omas Sattig has re-
cently oered a rather dierent denition that we nonetheless take to be equivalent:
(TP:RSR) A spacetime point or region R is a temporal part of a spacetime
region R′ relative to a frame of reference f =df R is amaximal sum
of parts of R′ that are simultaneous relative to f .
(TP:OSR) An object x is a temporal part of an object y relative to a frame
of reference f =df (i) x is part of y, (ii) y [exactly] occupies a
spacetime region R, (iii) x occupies a point or region that is a
temporal part of R relative to f , and (iv) x does not occupy any
other region. (Sattig 2006, 179)
Here is how the basic entities that these denitions pick out can be character-
ized in a more relativistically acceptable manner. First, let us say that a perduring
object’s path is the spacetime region that it exactly occupies.12 ¿e characterization
is then that:
TP P is a instantaneous temporal part of O just if (i) P is a part of O, (ii) P ex-
actly occupies a region RP that is spacelike,13 (iii) RP is a maximal spacelike
subregion of the path RO of O and (iv) RP is at.
¿e vital question is now whether the perdurantist should adopt TP. Clause
(i) needs no justication. (ii) captures the idea that the part is ‘instantaneous’; i.e.,
that it has no temporal extent. (iii) corresponds to Sider’s requirement that a tem-
poral part of O at t overlap every part of O that exists at t. We are happy to be
stipulative here. (iv), on the other hand, is quite without motivation. It is a relic of
the frame-relative perspective. While at regions of spacetime are in some sense
geometrically privileged, there is no reason to suppose that this gives them any
special metaphysical status, in the context of questions about persistence or oth-
erwise. More signicantly, one surely wants a denition applicable in the context
of our best theory of space and time, general relativity. While this theory allows
spacetimes containing at spacelike regions, generic matter-lled worldtubes will
have no at maximal spacelike subregions. ¿e obvious emendation, therefore, is
simply to drop clause (iv). ¿is gives our preferred denition of an instantaneous
temporal part.
12Wewill soon replace this denitionwithGilmore’smore general, and hencemore useful, notion
(Gilmore forthcoming, §2). ¿e general style of denition that we see as suitable for the relativistic
context is very similar to the style adopted by Gilmore. As we said above (p. 1), our general criticism
that philosophers do not take relativity seriously enough should not be taken to apply to Gilmore.
13A region R is spacelike just if every pair of distinct points in R are spacelike separated. ¿is is
just Gilmore’s notion of achronal (Gilmore forthcoming, §2).
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Now it is certainly true that temporally extended objects are temporally ex-
tended in virtue of being composed of temporal parts. But our earlier claim still
stands: from the relativistic point of view, temporal parts are hardly worth den-
ing. Consider a spatial analogy. I position my desk so that one edge runs exactly
North–South. Is it true thatmy desk extends in theNorth–South direction in virtue
of being composed of a set of two-dimensional parts running East–West? Yes. But
it is equally true that it extends in the North–South direction in virtue of being
composed of a set of two-dimensional parts running North–South. Its being com-
posed of the set of pointlike parts standing in the conguration they in fact stand
in explains its being extended in a North–South direction just as well too. It should
be clear that relativity’s unication of space and time leaves no distinctive work for
the notion of a temporal part to do in explaining persistence.
2.2 Formulating Relativistic Endurance
Much of our discussion of relativistic perdurance is applicable to the analogous
topic of relativistic endurance. To this topic we now turn.
In the non-relativistic context, enduring objects are meant to be entities that
are (1) only spatially extended (if extended at all) and (2) wholly present at each
moment at which they exist. Since we are supposing that they are, tenselessly, at
each of these times, they are (3) multiply located. Since enduring objects change,
they cannot in general possess properties simpliciter but rather (4) instantiate a
property only relative to a time.
It should be clear from our discussion of perdurance that the wrong way to
relativistically re-construe all this is to replace reference to moments and times
with reference to the times of inertial frames. One should not say, for example,
that relative to each inertial frame, an enduring object is wholly present at multiple
times in that inertial frame.14
We recommend that the would-be endurantist adopt the following position in
the context of relativity.15 Corresponding to the non-relativistic properties (2) and
(3), the endurantist should say that persisting objects aremultiply located in space-
14We have already mentioned that Sider’s discussion of relativistic endurance places undue em-
phasis on times-in-frames (see fn 8). Rea proposes that the endurantist restrict composition to
“times in frames of reference” (Rea 1998, 234). Sattig proposes that relativistic endurantism be for-
mulated as the claim that: “(i) an ordinary object occupiesmultiple spacetime regions, and (ii) these
regions are temporally unextended, or instantaneous, relative to some inertial frame of reference,
and lie on dierent frame-relative hyperplanes” (Sattig 2006, 179). It should be clear why we object
to at least the formulation of all these proposals.
15Despite the reservations expressed in the last footnote, Sattig’s view is close to the one we rec-
ommend in that it involves entities that are not temporally extended exactly occupying multiple
regions of spacetime. It is again Gilmore who has articulated the most satisfactory relativistic ver-
sion of endurance (cf. Gilmore forthcoming, §2).
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time: they are (tenselessly) wholly present in multiple regions of spacetime.16 Cor-
responding to property (1), the endurantist should hold that these regions are not
temporally extended, i.e., they are spacelike: any two distinct points in such a re-
gion should be spacelike related. Corresponding to property (4), the endurantist
should hold that persisting objects do not (in general) instantiate properties sim-
pliciter, but rather only relative to particular spacetime regions, viz. their locations
(or suitable regions that contain their locations). All of this leaves open the ques-
tion of which spacelike regions an enduring object occupies. We postpone proper
discussion of this question until Section 5.
A few comments on the idea that objects can be multiply located are in order.
Some nd the very idea paradoxical.17 We will not try to convince everyone that
the notion makes sense, but we are concerned to carry with us those who have
no problem with the idea of endurance in a (tenseless eternalist) non-relativistic
context. To this end it is useful to distinguish two conceptions of the spacetime
of Newtonian physics. According to one way of thinking Newtonian spacetime
is at some level of abstraction no dierent from relativistic spacetime. One has a
four-dimensional manifold of spacetime points that stand in the very same kind of
spatial and temporal distance relations. ¿e only dierence concerns the patterns
in which these various relations are instantiated. In the Newtonian case, every pair
of spacetime points stand in some temporal distance relation, and all and only those
between which there is zero temporal separation stand, additionally, in some spa-
tial distance relation. In the relativistic case, spatial (i.e. spacelike), temporal (i.e.
timelike) and null distances are mutually exclusive. Every pair of points stand in
one of these relations, but if they stand in one of them, they do not stand in either of
the others. Anyone who assimilates the spacetimes of Newtonian physics and rel-
ativity to this extent surely will not have trouble with the notion of multi-location
in the latter but not the former.
We suspect, therefore, that those who think they can make sense of endurance
in a Newtonian context, but think they cannot do so in a relativistic context, con-
ceive of Newtonian spacetime in a very dierent way. When it comes to Newtonian
spacetime they believe (ex hypothesi) in the equal reality of all parts of the four-
dimensionalmanifold of possible event locations, but they do not see thismanifold
as a fundamentally unitary entity, the partitioning of which into times (surfaces of
simultaneity) is merely a function of the temporal distance relations between its
16¿ere is more to be said about this notion of being (exactly) located at a particular region of
spacetime or, correlatively, of exactly occupying such a region. Although we will touch on some of
the issues, we refer the reader to Sattig’s discussion (2006, 48) and, especially, to Gilmore’s in this
volume (forthcoming, §2).
17Barker and Dowe (2003, 2005) provide an interesting argument to this eect. Our preferred
response is that of Gilmore (forthcoming, §2): an object can exactly occupy a set of regions without
exactly occupying the fusion of those regions.
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parts. Rather, they will take times as fundamental and see the four-dimensional
manifold one obtains from their union as the thing that has a secondary status. For
such an endurantist, existing atmore than one timemight seem importantly dier-
ent from being located in more than one place in a single space. And exemplifying
a property in a time-relative manner may not simply be a matter of exemplifying a
property relative to the (temporal) location one is at.
Our challenge to such endurantists is to articulate what goes onwhen an endur-
ing object time-travels so as to coexist with its younger self. It would be a problem
for the endurantist if he could not accommodate the conceptual possibility of time
travel (cf. Sider 2001, 101–9). ¿e most natural, and we think correct, endurantist
description of the envisaged scenario is that the enduring object not only exists at
many dierent times but also exists at (is located at) more than one place at the
same time. It is no more problematic to think of property instantiation as rela-
tivized to spatial locations as to temporal locations: in one place, the time traveler
is standing (and dark haired); in another he is sitting (and grey haired).18 But this
type of spatial multi-location, and location-relative property instantiation is all the
endurantist needs in order to understand multi-location in relativistic spacetime.
2.3 Formulating Relativistic Truth Conditions
So far we have sought to articulate the versions of various views familiar from non-
relativistic debates (eternalism, endurantism and perdurantism) that are natural
from the relativistic point of view. Our task is almost done, but there is one po-
sition that we have not yet examined, namely the tenseless theory of time and its
indexical treatment of tensed utterances. Recall that, according to this view, tensed
utterances (located as they are at certain times) are held to be true just if the ap-
propriate things are going on at those times (or, for utterances in tenses other than
the present, at times bearing the right temporal relations to the time of utterance).
Since there are no times in relativity, some revision is in order here too.
In spite of our earlier complaints, with regard to tensed utterances frame-rel-
ativization might seem legitimate. Familiarity with relativity should not prevent
us from acknowledging a natural propensity to believe in (absolute) simultaneity.
¿e detenser sees our present tense utterances as an attempt to talk of those events
we believe to be occurring at that time. Given relativity, such a belief is arguably
just false. But a more charitable interpretation regards it as merely incomplete,
this being remedied by supplying a frame to accompany our talk of that which is
‘simultaneous’. ¿e most obvious way to do this is to idealize and use the frame in
18Here we disagree with Sider (2001, 104–5). Our time traveler is located at P and is standing
there at t, and also located at P′ and is sitting there at t. At t he is both sitting and standing. ¿ere is
no contradiction, for he does these things in dierent places. But he is not (then) both sitting and
standing at P′; at this location, he is only sitting.
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which the speaker is (instantaneously) at rest at the spacetime ‘point’ at which the
utterance is made. One then applies the standard non-relativistic account of the
tenseless truth conditions of tensed utterances to this utterance with respect to this
frame.
¿is way of interpreting tensed utterances will have some counterintuitive con-
sequences. Suppose (improbably) that two people are discussing the goings on in
some far distant solar system in their mutual topological present.19 Given the dis-
tances involved, these two speakers need only bemoving with respect to each other
with a small relative velocity for one and same event to count as having occurred
many years ago for one speaker but to be an event that will occurmany years in the
future for the other. But given the speed of light (and given the time it takes to have
a thought or make an utterance), such anomalies only show up when astronomical
distances are involved. For all practical purposes, when our talk is conned to dis-
cussing processes and events that occur over even the smallest timescales that we
can perceptually discriminate, at locations no more spatially distant from us than,
say, the diameter of the Earth, with respect to any shared region of spacetime all
speakers will agree concerning which tensed sentences are true, no matter what
(within practical limits) their relative velocities.
While the frame-relativized proposal for interpreting tensed utterances will get
the truth values of realistic tensed utterances right, we wish to suggest an alterna-
tive, which we think has some rather attractive consequences.
Tensed utterances describe the world from a particular spatiotemporal view.
Our spatiotemporal viewof theworld privileges a spatially extended present. Why?20
We think a plausible answer starts with the suggestion that we take the present to
be the location of the objects with which we can interact. ¿e past can only causally
aect us; we cannot, as of the here and now, aect it. ¿e future can only be aected
by us; it cannot aect us in the here and now. But objects and events in the present
both act on us and can be acted on by us (and by acting on us through our senses,
they do so in a much more immediate and vivid manner than objects in the past).
Setting things up in this way leads to an obvious question: in the context of
relativity, what is the extent of the domain of those objects which, at somemoment
in our lives, both can act upon us and be acted upon by us? Here by ‘moment’
19¿e topological present, or absolute elsewhere of a spacetime point p is the set of points that are
spacelike related to it. From the perspective of any point, relativistic spacetime can be considered
to be divided into three exclusive regions: the absolute future of that point (the set of all points that
can be connected to p by a future-directed timelike or lightlike curve starting at p), its absolute past
(the set of all points that can be connected to p by a past-directed timelike or lightlike curve starting
at p), and its absolute elsewhere.
20¿e following takes its inspiration from Buttereld (1984) and Stein (1991, 158–62) though it
hardly does justice to these subtle papers. We strongly recommend the latter to any philosopher
tempted to engage in frame-relativization of their favorite concepts in the face of relativity.
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we mean a temporally extended but short-lived (i.e. momentary) interval, and the
answer will depend on its temporal extent. Let us rst take it to be the duration
of the specious present, the time it takes to have a single thought or enjoy a sin-
gle experience. ¿is, let us say, is about 0.2 of a second. Call the temporally ex-
tended spacetime region you occupy (partially or multiply) during this ‘moment’
NOW. To be something that can aect you in the NOW, an object must be located
within the backward lightcone of the future boundary of NOW. To be something
that can be aected by you, as located in the NOW, the object must fall within
the future light cone of the past boundary of NOW. Call the region bounded by
these two lightcones the Stein Present of the NOW.21 ¿e NOW’s Stein Present is
a four-dimensional discus-shaped region centered on the NOW. ¿e immediate
thing to note about it is that it is, spatially speaking, very wide (of the order of
60,000 kilometers), even though it is, temporally speaking, very thin (no wider
that 0.2 seconds, where it overlaps the NOW).
¿e source of the presentist’s (false) intuitionmight then be as follows. ¿ey are
inclined to accord a kind of ontological privilege to that with which they can (then)
interact. What they can interact with, at a particular near-momentary subregion
R of their worldtube, is the contents of that region’s Stein Present. But we noted
above that such a Stein Present has very little temporal thickness and is very large in
spatial extent. Such a region is easilymistaken for an instantaneous, global present.
We propose to link tensed talk to Stein Presents as follows. Our tensed talk,
which reports our spatiotemporal perspective on the world as at R, should be par-
tially analyzed in term of R’s Stein Present. ¿e present tense is correctly used at R
to talk about objects and events as they are in the Stein Present of R, the past tense
is correctly used to talk about objects and events as they are in the absolute past of
R, and the future tense is correctly used to talk about objects and events as they are
in the absolute future of R.
¿ese categories are not exhaustive. ¿ere are regions of the absolute elsewhere
of R that fall outside its Stein Present. But this is just as it should be. It is intuitively
right that, if the temporal extent of the now is of the order of a specious present,
then one cannot correctly use the present tense to talk about some event in one’s
absolute elsewhere that is, say, four light years away. It also means that, during the
eleventh Apollo mission, no one in mission control in Houston could sensibly ask
“What is Armstrong doing now?” while he was on theMoon. But rather than being
a problem for the proposal, this just highlights that the duration of ‘now’ is (nor-
mally) longer than the specious present and is, quite generally, context sensitive.22
21A er Stein (1991, 159–60), who singles out the same region for somewhat dierent reasons.
22Consider how extended the ‘now’ must be for the following exchange to be appropriate. Long-
time family friend: “What are Alice and Bob up to now?” Alice’s mother: “¿ey’re trying for a
baby.”
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3 Coexistence, relativity and endurance
We have already provided inter alia an initial sketch of our preferred version of
relativistic endurance (see Section 2.2). It is now time to consider the recent spate
of anti-endurantist arguments that appeal to relativity. Our primary purpose is to
demonstrate that they all fail, but discussion of the arguments will also provide us
with an opportunity to articulate further what relativistic endurance must involve.
We start with an argument, due to Yuri Balashov, that appeals to a notion of
non-trivial coexistence (Balashov 2000a,c). Our discussion is indebted to Gilmore
(2002), who we think has already given the decisive rebuttal. Balashov has since
replied to Gilmore (Balashov 2005), marshalling against endurantism further ar-
guments based on coexistence and relativity that he rst employed against stage
theory (Balashov 2002). We will see that these arguments are no more eective.
Balashov assumes eternalism, but suggests that both endurantists and perdu-
rantists should acknowledge a non-trivial sense of ‘coexist’ such that the set of
things with which an object coexists (as located at some spacetime region R)23
is neither empty (except for the object itself) nor simply the set of things located
somewhere in spacetime (2000a, 139; 2002, 230–1). ¿e following claims, which we
take to be true when appropriately understood, illustrate the idea. We both (now)
coexist with Yuri Balashov, and have done since birth. We both used to coexist with
Quine, but do so no longer. At no point in our lives has either of us coexisted with
Napoleon.
Balashov’s original argument, as Gilmore nicely sets out, involves three prin-
cipal claims (Gilmore 2002, 243–4). (1) In the relativistic context, the non-trivial
coexistence of twoobjects should be taken (by bothperdurantists and endurantists)
to be grounded in the (at least partially) spacelike separation of the two spacetime
regions that the objects occupy. (Gilmore calls this CASS: Coexistence As Space-
like Separation.) (2) ¿e endurantist, but not the perdurantist, must understand
non-trivial coexistence in a ‘tensed’ or ‘temporally loaded’ manner. (Gilmore calls
this the Asymmetry ¿esis.) (3) A temporally loaded notion of coexistence (but
only a temporally loaded notion) based on spacelike separation leads to absurdity.
23Where possible we will speak of objects’ locations intending to cover both the (exact but non-
unique) locations of enduring objects and the (partial) locations of perduring objects. Note that
the qualifying relativization of coexistence to a spacetime region is as appropriate for (the tempo-
ral parts of) perduring objects as for enduring objects. O en property instantiation by temporal
parts of perduring objects is property instantiation simpliciterwhereas, for enduring objects, it must
(almost) always be relativized to a spacetime region (a possible exception being any constant prop-
erties such as the charge of elementary particles). But which objects a temporal part of a perduring
object coexists with in a non-trivial sense is just as much a function of its spacetime location as it
is for enduring objects. Since the temporal part of the perduring object has but one location, the
location relativization can be dropped without ambiguity; the same is obviously not true in the case
of enduring objects.
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(Gilmore calls this the Absurdity ¿esis.) We will consider these claims in order,
agreeing with Gilmore that (1) and (3) are false. As regards (2), we will concede
some ground, but not enough to make Balashov’s argument go through.
3.1 ¿e Coexistence Relation
Balashov settles on spacelike separation as the appropriate relativistic relation to
ground non-trivial coexistence because he sees it as the best candidate that is (i)
objective, (ii) symmetric and (iii) relevant.24 Weshall see in amoment thatGilmore
rejects (i), favoring instead of CASS a frame-relative coexistence relation. We noted
in Section 2.3 that giving frame-relativized truth conditions for tensed utterances
is not obviously misguided. ¿is fact can be used to motivate Gilmore’s proposal,
for surely the obvious non-trivial notion of coexistence is just the (present) tensed
notion, and is thus intimately related to our earlier discussion of tense. We explore
this connection below. In fact, the frame-relativized truth conditions proposal can
also be used tomotivate an alternative candidate coexistence relation thatmeets the
objectivity requirement. Unfortunately, as we shall see, this second proposal has
other unwelcome features. Our proposal to interpret tensed utterances in terms of
Stein Presents suggests a third option. We review its strengths before contrasting
the proposal with Balashov’s CASS. Our problem with CASS is that it does not,
a er all, meet the relevance requirement.
We do not question the last two of Balashov’s three putative desiderata. We take
it as analytic that coexistence is symmetric. (Our preferred parsing of the relation
is: x coexists with y i x exists for y and y exists for x. So conceived, it is clearly
symmetric, although exists for may not be.) ¿e criterion of relevance is also not
disputable. If the coexistence of x and y is to be understood as grounded in some
further relation holding between them (or their locations), it had better be clear
why this relation’s holding means that x and y coexist. But what of objectivity?
Gilmore’s preferred alternative to CASS is a frame-relativized notion of coex-
istence: x (as at p) and y (as at q) coexist relative to frame F i their locations (p
and q) are simultaneous-in-F (Gilmore 2002, 254). ¿ere is an obvious connection
between Gilmore’s suggestion and the frame-relativized truth conditions proposal
of Section 2.3. Suppose one adopts our proposal that x coexists with y i x exists
for y and y exists for x. ¿en any speaker S, as located at r, can truly say that x
and y coexist (present tense) just if, for S as at r, x exists (present tense) for y and
vice versa. In other words, any speaker S can truly say at r that x and y coexist
(present tense) just if there are locations p and q of x and y that are simultaneous
with r in the instantaneous rest frame of S at r. But that is just to say that x and y,
24See Balashov (2000a, 139–49; 2000c, S555) for a discussion of the merits of CASS. See Balashov
(2000a, 133) for the three desiderata.
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as at these locations, coexist relative to S’s rest frame in Gilmore’s sense. (Similarly,
S can truly say at r that the two objects coexisted if they have locations that are
simultaneous with respect to S’s instantaneous rest frame at r but which lie on a
plane of simultaneity to the past of r, relative to this frame.)
As Gilmore concedes, the proposal violates (i), where this is understood as re-
quiring that there be an absolute fact of the matter (and not merely a variety of
frame-relative facts) about whether two objects coexist (Balashov 2000c, S553).
However, the machinery of frame-relative truth conditions can be used to con-
struct a coexistence relation that satises (i) a er all. In the analysis of the pre-
ceding paragraph what counted was whether x exists for y and y exists for x from
some third-person perspective. Dierent perspectives, and thus dierent frames,
yield dierent answers to the question of whether x and y coexist. But perhaps we
can satisfy (i) by nding an objectively preferred frame (or even pair of frames) to
give an objectively preferred answer. One obvious suggestion is to ask whether x
exists for y from y’s (tensed) perspective and whether y exists for x from x’s (tensed)
perspective.
Combining this idea with the frame-relative truth conditions for tensed utter-
ances, however, yields a notion that Balashov considers and rightly rejects (Balashov
2000a, 136–7). Here is the problemwith it. x, as at p, coexists with y, as at q, i x ex-
ists for y at q and y exists for x at p. But to exist for x as at p (in the present-tensed,
frame-relativized sense), y need only be located at some point that is simultaneous
with p in x’s rest frame (as at p). ¿is need not be q, which in general will not be
simultaneous with p (in x’s instantaneous rest frame at p). Similarly, for x to be
real for y as at q, x need only be located at some point that is simultaneous with q
in y’s rest-frame (as at q). Again, this need not be p. But surely the coexistence of
x as at p with y as at q, if this is to be a matter of the spatiotemporal relations hold-
ing between their locations, should just be a matter of the spatiotemporal relation
between p and q, not a matter of how four of their locations are interrelated.25
¿at frame-relativized truth conditions yield such an unsatisfactory notion of
non-trivial coexistence could actually be taken as a reason to reject the frame-
relativized truth conditions proposal. How do our alternative truth conditions in
term of Stein Presents fair? We think that Stein Presents may be rather well suited
to grounding the kind of non-trivial coexistence relation required.
¿e idea that there is a link between non-trivial coexistence and tensed attri-
butions of existence suggests the following. Consider two persisting objects x and
y located at p and q respectively. We are supposing that p and q are pointlike (or,
if the idealization that x and y have no spatial extent is dropped, that p and q have
25Balashov thinks that coexistence so construed would involve “representation in absentia”
(Balashov 2000a, 137), but since each of the four locations involved has the relevant enduring object
tenselessly located at it, we have trouble understanding what Balashov means by ‘in absentia’ here.
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no temporal thickness). Even so, there may be associated with x, as at p, a con-
textually determined, temporally extended now (NOWp), centered on p. Where
x is something that has experiences, the extent of such a NOW will never be less
than x’s specious present. If x is capable of relatively sophisticated reection on its
spatiotemporal environment, then, as seen above (p. 13), context may determine
that the NOWs associated with some points of its worldline have a temporal extent
greater than this. A non-sentient persister has no specious present; does this mean
that for each point p of its worldline the only relevant Stein Present is simply p it-
self? At one level this seems correct: there is no non-trivial notion of coexistence
applicable to such objects because, having no perspective at all, they have no spa-
tiotemporal perspective on the world. ¿ere can be no question of which objects
exist for them as at p. On the other hand, it seems that someonemight legitimately
talk of the (non-trivial) coexistence of non-sentient objects, in which case, we sug-
gest, the contextually determined duration of the speaker’s NOW, at the time of
any such attribution, is used to determine extended NOWs for the objects under
consideration.
With temporally extended NOWs for x and y (associated with points p and q)
in hand, we can make the following proposal: x and y coexist just if p falls within
the Stein Present of NOWq and q falls within the Stein Present of NOWp. ¿e pro-
posal gives our illustrative coexistence claims the right truth values. But more than
this, coexistence turns out to be very close to what one might, pre-theoretically,
have taken it to be. If x and y coexist (as at p and q respectively), then x is in the
present of y and vice versa. ¿eir presents (at p and q) substantially overlap and
so, as at these regions, there is a reasonable sense in which they share a common
present. And, reassuringly, since communication is a specic form of interaction,
we will always coexist in the non-trivial sense with those with whom we are (then)
communicating.
As dened, coexistence is symmetric. But the more basic notion in terms of
which it is dened—x exists for y at q i x is located somewhere within y’s Stein
Present at q—is not. In most cases the relation will hold in both directions (as
one would hope), but it need not do so. And this, we think, is as it should be.
Elephants, and indeed humans, have a much slower metabolism than gnats. ¿is
means that a gnat’s Stein Presents (assuming these are taken to be determined by
the duration of the gnat’s specious present) are much less spatially extended than
ours. But this seems intuitively right. ¿e spatial horizons of the world of the gnat
aremore limited than ours. Now consider two inhabitants of spacetimewith wildly
dierent metabolic rates (an extreme case of the elephant and gnat). ¿ey could be
located in regions R and R′ respectively such that the inhabitant with the shorter
specious present, located at R′, exists for the inhabitant with the more extended
specious present, located at R, but not vice versa. ¿is again seems to us to be the
right result.
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Clearly work needs to be done to esh out these tentative suggestions, but
our conviction is that the machinery of Stein Presents promises to provide an in-
tuitively satisfying notion of coexistence that obviously meets the relevance re-
quirement. Contrast this with Balashov’s CASS (or with his replacement CASH
(Balashov 2005, 20), according to which a collection of n objects coexist as at their
n respective locations i these locations all lie on a at spacelike hypersurface).
¿is allows that objects can coexist no matter how distant, and thus nomatter how
causally disconnected. As our earlier discussion of Stein Presents should suggest,we
think this gets things exactly the wrong way round.26 Once one learns to take rela-
tivity seriously, it should be obvious that, to controvert Balashov’s example, Gamow
and the Andromeda Nebula do not coexist in anything but the eternalist’s univer-
salist sense.27
3.2 ¿e Asymmetry¿esis
We now turn to the second of Balashov’s three central claims. ¿e Asymmetry
¿esis is the assertion that only endurantists are committed to a ‘temporally loaded’
understanding of coexistence (Balashov 2000a, 150–3; 2000c, S552–3; 2005, 12–4).
In seeking to understand this claim one needs to keep two things in mind. First,
Balashov assumes that the relativistic endurantist will be an eternalist detenser, so,
although Balashov’s language in places suggests otherwise, ‘temporally loaded’ is
not meant to indicate that the eternalist is committed to, e.g., a tensed view of time.
Second, both the perdurantist and endurantist should admit the propriety of tensed
talk, where this is understood as (no more than) a way of describing the world in a
perspective-dependent way from a particular spatiotemporal point of view.28
So what does Balashov mean by ‘temporally loaded’? Balashov is explicit that
the dierence between enduring and perduring objects that grounds the legitimacy
of applying ‘temporally loaded’ determinations to the former but not the latter, is
26In terms of the desiderata of this section, we therefore think that CASS in fact violates (iii).
27Balashov defends this aspect of his proposal by suggesting that even in the non-relativistic
case, where existing at the same time is (allegedly) uncontroversially the relation that grounds non-
trivial coexistence, causally unconnected items coexist (Balashov 2005, 6). It should be clear from
our previous discussion of Stein Presents why we are as suspicious of this idea in the non-relativistic
context as we are in the relativistic one.
28Again, Balashov’s language at times suggests that the perdurantist cannot admit the legitimacy
of tensed talk. In fact, Balashov is only keen to stress that perduring objects are singly located in
spacetime and, as such, can only have one spatiotemporal perspective on the world. He should not
deny that various tensed claims are true or false with respect to such a perspective. ¿e temporal
parts of a perduring object have their ownunique spatiotemporal perspectiveswith respect towhich
dierent tensed claimswill be true and false. Balashov admits that there is therefore a sense inwhich
perduring objects have many dierent spatiotemporal perspectives on reality, but he downplays it
as a merely vicarious sense (Balashov 2005, 14–6).
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that enduring objects aremultiply located in spacetime whereas perduring objects
are singly located. ¿is, in turn, is held to mean that enduring objects (and only
enduring objects) “change their position in spacetime” (2000a, 162). ¿us, it is
claimed, for an enduring object as located at any one of its many locations, the
world is divided, not just into those things with which it coexists (in the non-trivial
sense) and thosewith which it does not, but also into those things with which it still
exists, or with which it no longer exists, and so on (2000a, 149–50; 2000c, S557–8).
Occupying more than one location in spacetime is certainly a necessary con-
dition of changing one’s location in it. But it is not sucient. We basically agree
with Gilmore when he responds that change of position in a space M is change
of position in M with respect to some temporal dimension T separate from M
(2002, 249; forthcoming, §2). Balashov, however, is not suggesting, as Weyl ap-
parently once did, that endurantists should think of persisting objects as “crawling
upward along” their worldlines (Weyl 1949, 116). All Balashov means is that en-
during objects have many distinct spacetime locations with respect to the proper
time along their trajectories (Balashov 2005, 14). For the eternalist detenser, this
is a perfectly respectable tenseless fact. And since one should be happy to recog-
nize, in general, that an enduring object’s instantiating incompatible properties at
dierent moments of proper time along its trajectory constitutes change, why can
it not similarly be said that an enduring object changes its spacetime location with
respect to its proper time?
Part of our problemwith this idea is the uncritical employment of the notion of
proper time as applied to a persisting object. ¿us far we have tacitly accepted Bal-
ashov’s idealization of persisting objects as spatially unextended. Balashov views
this idealization as harmless (2005, 2; 2005, 8), at least as regards the current argu-
ment, but in this respect it is not. Howmight a notion of proper time for a spatially
extended worldtube be dened? ¿e obvious thought is that we should consider
the worldline of the center of mass of the object, and regard proper time along this
curve as giving the ‘proper time of the object’. Unfortunately the center of mass
of an object is not a relativistically well-dened notion.29 Perhaps, however, Bal-
ashov does not need the proper time of the object to be well dened. It might be
enough to consider the proper time along any timelike worldline lying within the
29Balashov equates an ‘object’s proper time’ with “the age of the object in its rest frame” (Balashov
2005, 9). But the (instantaneous) rest frame of a spatially extended object is equally not well dened.
¿e problem is very simply illustrated. Consider an object that has just two pointlike parts of equal
mass. Suppose that, with respect to some frame of reference F, they ‘oscillate’, moving uniformly
towards each other for a period of time before moving uniformly away from each other at the same
speed for an equal period of time. ¿e situation described involves the composite object’s being at
rest in F. But consider a frame comoving with one of the particles during its motion towards the
other particle. ¿e object will also be, periodically, at rest in this frame for periods that begin with
the other particle’s change of direction and end with the comoving particle’s change of direction. So
the object is at rest in both of two frames in relative motion.
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worldtube of the object; one might then say that the enduring object changes its
spacetime locations with respect to any such temporal parameter.
¿is suggestion founders on a more substantial problem. As we will see in
Section 5, the relativistic endurantist should not suppose that the locations of a
spatially extended persisting object foliate the object’s worldtube (or are otherwise
parameterizable by a single real number). ¿e most plausible version of relativis-
tic endurantism has persisting objects located at continuously many overlapping
spacelike regions of spacetime. ¿is means that, associated with each point along
some timelike curve within an object’s worldtube, there is an innity of regions that
the object occupies, not one. We conclude that, for realistic persisting objects, no
sense can be made of such an object’s ‘proper time’, and a fortiori no sense can be
made of its changing its location with respect to proper time.
It is also important to recognize how insubstantial a notion of change of space-
time location Balashov’s notion of an object’s proper time would provide, even if it
didmake sense. Talk of the object’s proper time, or of the object occupying a certain
region when it is a certain age, might lead one think of these notions as involving
something over and above the spatiotemporal distances between the object’s loca-
tions, as if the object could occupy the very same set of spacetime locations, but
at dierent moments of its proper time. ¿is would, of course, be a mistake. To
the extent that one can make sense of an enduring object’s proper time, this can be
nothing other than the timelike distance along the spacetime curve composed of
its locations.
Let us recap. Balashov believes that the enduring object’s multiple location
means that there is a sense in which the object changes its spacetime location and
thus that one can legitimately talk about other objects still or no longer coexisting
with that object. We have seen that, to the extent that sense can be made of it, the
idea that the enduring object changes its spacetime location comes to nothing over
and above the object’s being multiply located in timelike separated regions. But
perhaps the distinction between being multiply and singly located by itself gives us
that the ‘temporally loaded’ determinations still and no longer etc. are appropriate
for enduring objects alone.
A er all, these temporal modiers suggest the contrast (or comparison) of one
spatiotemporal perspective with a previous one.30 What does it mean to say that,
for persisting object O, as located at p, some other object O′ still exists? Surely this
involves the combination of two ideas: (a) O′ exists (in a non-trivial sense) for O,
as at p, and (b) O′ also exists for O, as at some other location p′, where p′ is in the
absolute past of p. Similarly, it would not be correct to say that O′ no longer exists
for O as at p, if it were not the case that (c) O′ does not exist for O, as at p, and (d)
O′ does exist for O, as located at some p′ in the absolute past of p. It seems that
30Just as “not yet”, for example, involves a contrast between one perspective and a later one.
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Balashov is right to suggest that such locutions are intimately tied to the object’s
being multiply located.
It follows that, in this ratherminimal way, there really is an asymmetry between
perduring and enduring objects in this regard. Whilst it can be correct to say of
some perduring objectO, partially located at p, that some other objectO′ no longer
exists, this is to be analyzed as: (e) O′ does not exist for the part of O located at
p and (f) O′ does exist for a part of O located in the absolute past of p. Such
‘temporally loaded’ locutions thus are applicable to perduring objects, but they do
not mean exactly what they mean when applied to enduring objects. As Balashov
stresses, whilst objects may literally still or no longer exist for enduring objects, for
perduring objects they may do so only in a vicarious sense (Balashov 2005, 16).
3.3 ¿e Absurdity¿esis
Wehave therefore conceded to Balashov a slight asymmetry between enduring and
perduring objects. But so understood it is not an asymmetry than can underwrite
the Absurdity ¿esis. To see why, we turn to the scenarios that Balashov believes
to spell trouble for the endurantist.
Suppose that one followed Balashov and took non-trivial coexistence to be
grounded in spacelike separation. In that case two objects O1 and O2 as at p1 and
p2 could both coexist with O as at p (p and p1 are spacelike separated as are p
and p2), even though O1 and O2 do not coexist with each other (p1 and p2 are not
spacelike separated) (Balashov 2000a, 155; 2000c, S560). Spacelike separation is
a non-transitive relation and so, if it is what grounds non-trivial coexistence, this
will be non-transitive too. But why should this trouble the endurantist?
Balashov’s answer is that this is because the endurantist requires a ‘temporally
loaded’ sense of coexistence according to which objects are sorted into those no
longer existent, those still or already existent, and those not yet existent (2000a,
149; 2005, 12–3). She “must be committed to this distinction in virtue of the basic
principle of her ontology” (2000a, 151). We simply deny this: while the endurantist
is entitled to a certain literal understanding of such ‘temporally loaded’ claims, there
is no reasonwhy shemust employ them. But in any case, adding to the description
of the allegedly problematic scenario the relevant ‘temporally loaded’ determina-
tions will not make it appear any more absurd. ¿at is, nothing is added by noting
that enduring object O, as at some spacetime location, can still exist with one ob-
ject and already exist with another, when these latter two objects do not coexist
with each other. ¿is addition merely introduces a comparison of how things are
at that particular location of O with how things are at past or future locations of O.
But if the scenario as originally described is not obviously problematic, how could
bringing in these comparisons make it so?
In fact, in his reply to Gilmore, Balashov concedes that, if the endurantist goes
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so far as to acceptCASS—that spacelike separation grounds non-trivial coexistence—
then he will not accept that the scenario just described involves an absurdity. ¿e
lack of transitivity involved is just what is to be expected (Balashov 2005, 18).
Balashov thinks that the way the endurantist defender of CASS can avoid ab-
surdity is by denying that O, as at p, coexists with both O1 (as at p1) and O2 (as at
p2), for ex hypothesi p1 and p2 are not spacelike separated. For what it is worth, we
see no reason why the CASS endurantist should not admit that O coexists in this
way with both O1 and O2, whilst simply denying that such coexistence is rendered
absurd by O1 (as at p1) and O2 (as at p2) not coexisting with each other.31 Be that as
it may, of more importance is Balashov’s next move, for he thinks the endurantist
will want to talk about the coexistence of more than two objects at once: CASS, he
thinks, requires generalization.
3.4 Objections from CASH
¿e generalization that Balashov suggests is CASH (Coexistence As Sharing a Hy-
perplane of simultaneity): a collection of n objects coexist, as at their n respective
locations, i these locations all lie on a at spacelike hypersurface (2005, 20). Bal-
ashov thinks: (I) this notion is preferable to a more liberal alternative (coexistence
as sharing of an arbitrary spacelike hypersurface), (II) that CASH involves a kind
of ‘contextuality’ (the details of which we will not discuss) that is problematic for
the endurantist (but not the perdurantist) and (III) that CASH involves a kind of
‘chronological incoherence’ (which is again problematic for the endurantist but not
the perdurantist). We disagree with all three theses.
With regard to (I), rst note that CASH, rather than the more liberal notion, is
simply not available in the context of general relativity, or even in a generic curved
spacetime (like our own!), where there are (typically) no at spacelike hypersur-
faces. Second, as will be discussed in Section 5, the endurantist should not restrict
the locations of persisting objects to at spacelike regions of spacetime even when
these are available. It follows that even when there are at spacelike hypersurfaces,
most locations of enduring objects do not fall within them. What do we say about
the coexistence of enduring objects as located at these non-at spacelike regions?
¿ird, Balashov’s reasons for rejecting coexistence as the sharing of arbitrary space-
like hypersurfaces are misguided. He writes:
[S]uppose three objects coexisting in a certain spatially at temporal-
like world form an Euclidean triangle there (i.e., a triangle whose an-
gles sum up to two right angles). Adding other objects to the coexis-
tence pool could make things go ‘wild’, even among the members of
31Gilmore makes the same point (2002, 246).
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the original group: the triangle they dene might suddenly stop being
Euclidean, and this for no physical reason. (Balashov 2005, 35)
By a “temporal-like world” Balashov simplymeans a global spacelike hypersurface.
Balashov believes that the endurantist should:
. . . take the facts aboutwhat object belongs towhat temporal-likeworld
at what point of its career – and what other objects it shares that world
with – as the ground of all the important features exhibited in the tem-
poral ‘multi-universe’. ¿ese include temporary properties of objects
and their changing relations with each other. ¿e fact that all enduring
objects trivially share the single spacetime manifold gives no further
purchase.
¿e endurantist must thus recognize existence in a temporal (or
temporal-like)world and sharing such aworld as basic facts. (Balashov
2005, 29–30)
We have quoted at length because we think this passage reveals the fundamen-
tal misconception that lies behind Balashov’s unsuccessful coexistence-based argu-
ments against relativistic endurantism. It suggests that Balashov, for reasons that
we cannot fathom, conceives of the endurantist as committed to a more substan-
tially ‘temporally loaded’ view of the world than anything we conceded in our ear-
lier discussion of the Asymmetry ¿esis. It is for this reason that we simply deny
what Balashov claims in theses (II) and (III), that ‘contextuality’ and ‘chronological
incoherence’ are any more problematic for the endurantist than the perdurantist.
Both the perdurantist and the endurantist can see them as nothing more than rela-
tivistically novel aspects of the way in which dierent spatiotemporal perspectives
within a single spacetime interrelate.
Asweunderstand the position, the relativistic endurantist should take the tense-
less facts about which spacetime regions enduring objects exactly occupy as basic.
It will follow from this pattern of multi-location in spacetime that various global
three-dimensional hypersurfaces in spacetime will have as subregions some of the
locations of some of the enduring objects in spacetime. Perhaps the right way to
analyze tensed utterances madewithin a relativistic world is in terms of such three-
dimensional hypersurfaces (though, as we discuss in Section 2.3, we doubt that this
is the case). But for enduring objects, just as much for perduring objects, such talk
merely encodes certain location-dependent perspectives. ¿e endurantist should
not take such hypersurfaces, and co-location on such hypersurfaces, as basic. Quite
the opposite is in fact true.
So, to turn to Balashov’s example of three objects forming a Euclidean triangle,
the endurantist will see the scenario as involving the following basic facts. ¿ere
are many at hypersurfaces wholly containing the three objects. Obviously, with
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respect to these surfaces, the triangle the three objects form is Euclidean. But equally
there are countless other surfaces containing these three objects, and with respect
to these surfaces the triangle they form will not (generally) be Euclidean. ¿is will
be so whether or not the universe of the three objects contains an additional ob-
ject. But in the examplewe suppose that there is an additional object. Moreover this
additional object is such that (i) no location of it is a subregion of an everywhere
spacelike surface with respect to which our rst three objects form a Euclidean tri-
angle, but (ii) some location of it is a subregion of an everywhere spacelike surface
also including our rst three objects but with respect to which the triangle they
form is not Euclidean. ¿at, at a fundamental level, is all the endurantist is com-
mitted to. Nothing goes “wild”, is “unstable” or changes from being Euclidean to
being non-Euclidean “for no physical reason.”
A nal comment on Balashov’s claim that CASH involves chronological in-
coherence is in order.32 Balashov’s argument begins with the claim that certain
sequences of spacelike hyperplanes containing more than one object are “chrono-
logically incoherent”: as the sequence progresses one moves in a future direction
along some object’s worldtube, but in a past direction along another’s. (¿us con-
sider a sequence that runs from SH1 to SH2 in Fig. 1(a), where A, B and C are the
worldtubes of three objects.) However, Balashov admits this to be no serious prob-
32Balashov employs an extremely similar argument against stage theoretic views of persistence
(Balashov 2002). Our criticisms of the argument against endurantism apply mutatis mutandis to
that against stage theory.
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lemprovided there is a sequence that is not chronologically incoherent. He adduces
the sequence of hyperplanes parallel to SH1 and SH3 as just such a sequence.
Balashov next contends, however, that “there are cases where a chronologically
coherent series of temporal-like worlds is not available (unless one makes such a
series improperly short)” (2005, 33); and moreover that such cases are problematic
for the endurantist but not perdurantist. His example of just such a case is Fig. 1(b).
We set aside the claimed disanalogy between endurance and perdurance, for
Balashov’s central contention—that no chronologically coherent sequence of hy-
perplanes is available—seems to us to be plainly false. Every foliation of space-
time by spacelike hyperplanes constitutes a chronologically coherent sequence, and
since they run from the most distant past to the farthest future, they can hardly be
deemed “improperly short.” As such a sequence progresses, one moves in a future
direction along the worldtube of every object (that has a worldtube that intersects
the hyperplanes in question).33
4 Problems with ‘Wholly Present’
We now turn to a very dierent style of objection to the combination of endurance
and relativity. Even in the non-relativistic context, many suspect that no sense can
be given to the endurantist’s central explanatory notion ofwholly present, or at least
no sense that dierentiates endurance from perdurance (See Sider 2001, 63–8). We
think the shi to ideas of exact location and of multiple location avoids some of
the problems. Steven Hales and Timothy Johnson, however, think that there is a
specically relativistic problem with an object’s being wholly present in more than
one spacetime location. In particular, they argue that in a relativistic spacetime,
“no object wholly exists at each moment of its existence” (Hales & Johnson 2003,
535, our emphasis). We shall see that their argument can be quickly dealt with.
33We nd it hard to understand why Balashov either overlooks the existence of such sequences,
or sees them as somehow inadmissable. Consider, again, Fig. 1(b). ¿ere are innitely many space-
like hyperplanes containing all four objects, D, E, F and G, including, let us suppose, ones where D
is ve years old and ones where D is forty-ve years old. It is true that, because F’s worldtube termi-
nates close to where E’s worldtube begins, a chronologically coherent sequence every hyperplane
of which contains all four objects will be relatively short-lived (no such sequence can contain both
the ve-year old D and the forty-ve year old D). However, these shorter sequences are always seg-
ments of longer, chronologically coherent sequences. According to such a longer sequence, three
of the objects coexist for a time, then the fourth comes into existence and all four coexist briey,
and then one of the original three ceases to exist. We do not understand why Balashov appears to
view such long-lived sequences as illegitimate. Granted, no such sequence contains, e.g., D coex-
isting with all three other objects both when aged ve and when aged forty-ve. But why think that
such sequences are in any way inadequate for this reason? ¿e fact that there are chronologically
incoherent sequences according to which D coexists with all four others both at age ve and at age
forty-ve seems to us to be simply irrelevant.
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Wequote their own summary of the argument in full, for it illustrates our theme
that relativity is not taken seriously enough even by those whose arguments appeal
to it. ¿ey write:
1. Endurantism is dened in this way: o is an enduring object i owholly exists
at each moment of its existence. ¿at is, at every time t at which o exists,
every proper part of o is at t (denition)
2. If SR is correct, then in the rest frame of an object o, each proper part of o is
at a specic time t, and that time is the same for all parts. But for an inertial
reference framemoving with respect to an object o, each proper part of o at a
dierent position along the direction of relative motion is at a dierent time.
¿at is, in a frame moving relative to o, o has proper parts at t, before t and
a er t (premise)
3. SR is correct (premise)
4. ¿us if there is a reference frame moving with respect to an object o, then in
that frame o has proper parts at t, before t and a er t (from 2, 3)
5. ¿e universe is not static, and so for any object there are inertial frames other
than the rest frame (premise)
6. ¿us every object has proper parts at dierent times (from 4, 5)
7. Hence no object wholly exists at each moment of its existence, and enduran-
tism as dened in (1) is false. (from 1, 6)
(Hales & Johnson 2003, 535)
We have already discussed at length why relativistic endurantists will not ac-
cept anything like Hales and Johnson’s denition of endurantism. Rather than talk
of times, they will talk of objects wholly existing in, or being exactly located at
certain spacetime regions. Note also that Hales and Johnson’s explanatory gloss on
the denition, in the second sentence of (1), appears to commit the endurantist
to mereological constancy: that each proper part of an object must be located in
a subregion of every region occupied by the object. One might think that such a
restriction on endurantism is quite unmotivated.
Hales and Johnson’s rst premise (2) needlessly appeals to frame-relative con-
cepts and, more seriously, appeals to the notion of the rest frame of the object,
which we saw in the previous section is, in general, meaningless. ¿ey appear to
argue, from how things will be described in two comoving inertial frames, that if
an enduring object is wholly located in one set of parallel at spacetime regions,
then it must also be located in another set of parallel at spacetime regions that
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intersect the regions in the rst set. We shall see in the next section that the en-
durantist should accept this conclusion, but they should not accept this argument
for it.34
We do not quarrel with (3), except to note that, because it is not a quantum
theory, even general relativity could not be considered as ‘correct’ without quali-
cation.
(4) and (5) suggest to us that Hales and Johnson have not fully grasped the
notion of a frame of reference. Even if the universe were static, there would still
exist an innity of inertial frames with respect to each of which the universe’s static
conguration could be (dierently) described.
We take (6) to be obviously compatiblewith endurance. In fact, since enduran-
tism just is the thesis that the object (and hence its proper parts) wholly exists at
many dierent times (or, better, spacetime regions), to deny (6) would be to deny
endurantism! It follows that (7), as allegedly derived from (1) and (6), is simply a
non sequitur.
To be fair to Hales and Johnson, part of the problem is with their own sum-
mary of the argument. ¿e idea behind the passage from (6) to (7) is the following.
Suppose that part of an enduring object O becomes damaged at some point in O’s
career. Consider a spacetime locationR ofO that, intuitively, lies immediately prior
to the damage event. ¿is event, and thus a location of the damaged part of O, will
be timelike related to some parts of R. But it will also be spacelike related to other
parts of R. Hales and Johnson’s thought is that there is a proper part of O, viz.
its damaged part, that is not located within R, even though this part, because it is
spacelike separated from some parts of O as located at R, is judged to be simulta-
neous with those parts, as located at R, in some frame of reference.35 If O has a
proper part not located at R, how can O be wholly present there?
¿e problem with this line of reasoning is obvious to see. For all Hales and
Johnson have said, the damaged part of O, located in the immediate future of R, is
also located somewhere in R. Relative to R it is undamaged. Relative to the location
in the immediate of future of part of R, it is damaged. But since O is an enduring
object, its parts also endure. ¿ey too are multiply located in spacetime.
34For discussion of why not, see Gilmore (forthcoming, §4.1).
35Wehave included this last observation for the sake of completeness, since it is an aspect of their
example that Hales and Johnson make much of. We, however, fail to see what it adds. Not unlike
Balashov, they take spacelike separation to be at least a sucient condition for a (presumably) non-
trivial notion of coexistence. ¿ey reason that if the damaged part of O coexists (in this sense)
with some parts of O located at R, but is not itself located at R, then O is not wholly present at R.
But if the non-existence at R of a proper part of O is problematic for the endurantist’s notion of
wholly present, we see this as problematic whether or not this part coexists in a non-trivial sense
with other parts of O at R, for it certainly coexists with them in the eternalist’s sense. For further
critical discussion of the role of coexistence in Hales and Johnson’s argument, see Miller (2004,
355–9).
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¿is observation saves endurantism from Hales and Johnson’s criticism, how-
ever, only to suggest another problem. What of objects that gain and lose parts?
How can they be wholly located in each region of spacetime in which they exist?36
We do not have much to say here, other than that this is a well known (alleged)
problem for (eternalist) endurantism, as potent in the non-relativistic context as
the relativistic.37 To some extent, switch to talk of ‘exact location’ mitigates the ap-
pearance of a problem, but if one thought that the exact location of an objectO in a
region R involved a combination of (i) no region of R not being occupied by a part
of O and (ii) no part of O lying outside R, then the problem remains. ¿e situation
currently being considered certainly violates the second of these conditions.
We shall see at the end of the next section that the perspective thatwe ultimately
recommend to the endurantist simply side-steps someof these problems. Beforewe
get there, however, we have another set of objections to relativistic endurantism to
consider. Our discussion of Hales and Johnson’s argument revealed that there is no
problem in principle with the idea that an enduring object may be exactly located
in two intersecting spacetime regions the points of each of which are simultaneous
with respect to dierent frames of reference. But should the endurantist conceive
of enduring objects as located in such regions? In fact, it is time to return to amore
general question, rst raised in Section 2.2. If enduring objects are exactly located
inmultiple spacelike regions of spacetime, inwhich such regions, precisely, are they
typically located?
5 Gilmore and the Every C-Slice Principle
Gilmore’s approach to this question is to rst dene the “path” of an object:
R is the path of O =df R is a region and is the union of the (region or)
regions that O exactly occupies. (Gilmore forthcoming, §2)
He then asks preciselywhere anobject is locatedwithin its path (Gilmore forthcoming,
§4). ¿e perdurantist answer is that an object exactly occupies its entire path. ¿e
endurantist instead regards an object as exactly occupying multiple regions within
its path. Very well; but which regions?
Gilmore suggests and then criticizes four dierent answers. ¿e Rest Frame
Principle holds that an object exactly occupies regions of its worldtube all the parts
36If we are right to interpret Hales and Johnson’s gloss on their denition of endurantism, quoted
above, as entailing mereological constancy, it would seem that their endurantist opponent will be
untroubled by this new argument!
37See Merricks (1999), which is devoted to this objection against the combination of eternalism
and endurance.
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of which are simultaneous in the rest frame of that object (forthcoming, §4.2).38
¿eTopDown Principle assumes a privileged temporal foliation of spacetime. Ob-
jects exactly occupy only those maximal regions of their worldtubes that are also
subregions of the leaves of this foliation (forthcoming, §4.3). ¿e Bottom Up Prin-
ciple, very roughly, imagines tiny timers attached to the pointlike parts of an object.
¿ese measure the proper time along the trajectories of the parts in question. Ini-
tially (and in a rather idealized way) the timers are set to zero. ¿e object then
exactly occupies regions of the worldtube where the timers on the pointlike parts
all read the same (forthcoming, §4.4).
We will not repeat Gilmore’s decisive objections to these three principles. In-
stead we focus on a fourth option, the Every Slice Principle (Gilmore forthcoming,
§4.1). ¿is holds that an object exactly occupies each and every achronal slice
through its worldtube.39 How is “slice” to be interpreted? Flat hyperplanes have
no special metaphysical signicance and in any case are not available in a curved
spacetime such as our own. Gilmore therefore means by “achronal slice” any hy-
persurface that is everywhere spacelike. In general the (spatial) geometry of such
a surface will be curved. One further qualication is also required: such regions
must be maximal, where a region is a maximal achronal slice through an object’s
worldtube i it is not a subregion of any other achronal regions within the object’s
worldtube.40 (In fact Gilmore only adds this qualication in response to an ob-
jection we consider below (p. 35; Gilmore forthcoming, §4.1).) In what follows we
refer to the Every Slice Principle (thus interpreted) by the acronym ESP. ¿e idea,
to repeat, is that enduring objects exactly occupy every maximal achronal region
within their worldtube.
Gilmore raises three apparent problems for ESP. We will nd it easiest to dis-
cuss them in reverse order. We begin, then, with his observation that, for the iden-
tication an object exactly occupying one region with an object exactly occupying
another, “an appropriate sort of causal relation (o en called ‘immanent causation’)”
must hold between these ‘objects’ (forthcoming, §4.1). ¿is very general principle
he calls MURIC (MUlti-location Requires Immanent Causation). We are minded
to accept it.41
Gilmore believes that ESP is incompatible with MURIC. In particular, the very
same object can, according to ESP, exactly occupy both of the overlapping regions
Ra and Rb in Fig. 2. But according to Gilmore MURIC does not permit this, since
38We use “worldtube” as a synonym for Gilmore’s “path”.
39Recall from fn 13 that a regionR is achronal i every pair of distinct pointswithin it are spacelike
related.
40Cf. Sattig’s denition of a temporal part of a region (p. 8 above).
41In particular, we think thatHumeans about causation should nd the principle no less plausible
than non-Humeans, at least when applied to familiar composite persisting objects like tables and
people.
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Figure 2
the object at Ra cannot be the (immanent) cause of the object at Rb, nor vice versa
(forthcoming, §4.1). If we are wedded to MURIC, it seems that ESP will have to go.
Let us take a step back. Anyone initially attracted to ESP will surely regard Ra
and Rb as containing objects and, indeed, objects of the same type; the remaining
question is whether they contain the very same object. Let the object at Ra be Oa
and that at Rb be Ob. In line with MURIC, we should indeed decide whether Oa
and Ob are one and the same based, in part, on whether they are causally related
in an appropriately intimate way. But we say that they are so related. In particular,
every part of Oa is either (i) an immanent cause of the state of a particular part of
Ob (viz. itself), (ii) in a state that is immanently caused by a part of Ob, or (iii) must
be reckoned a part of Ob because it is exactly located in a region where Ra and Rb
overlap. (¿e same holdsmutatis mutandis for every part ofOb.) Granted, the state
of Oa as a whole is not causally grounded in the state of Ob, or indeed vice versa;
but the satisfaction of (i) to (iii) surely constitutes excellent grounds to nonetheless
identify Oa and Ob.
We think that this observation saves ESP from Gilmore’s MURIC objection,
but consideration of the remainder of Gilmore’s discussion will be instructive. In
response to his alleged diculty with MURIC, Gilmore oers the defender of ESP
an amended version. Gilmore calls thisMURIC*:
Necessarily, for any material object O and distinct spacetime regions
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R1 and R2, if O exactly occupies both R1 and R2, then there is some
region R such that:
(i) R1 and R2 are achronal slices of R,
(ii) there is a set S of achronal slices of R such that every point in
R belongs to at least one member of S, and for any two mem-
bers, x and y, of S, the contents of x bear the appropriate sort
of immanent causal relation to the contents of y, or vice versa.
(forthcoming, §4.1)
A er noting two points in favor of MURIC*, Gilmore objects to it as follows.
Consider an entity composed of several molecules bound together. In the rest
frameof that entity, themolecules are all replaced, successively but extremely rapidly,
by intrinsic duplicates to which they are causally unrelated. With diagrammatic
gaps representing non-causal replacement (but not spatiotemporal gaps) we thus
have the situation depicted in Fig. 3.
¿e objects exactly located at the regions labeled R1 and R2 are surely distinct,
since they are on opposite sides of a causal discontinuity. But MURIC* apparently
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lets us down, in that it fails to rule out their identity.42 ¿is is because, at least
according to Gilmore, there is a set S satisfying requirement (ii) of MURIC*: (e.g.)
the set of parallel slices running from Resti to Rest f (forthcoming, §4.1).
Since we do not judge MURIC and ESP to be incompatible (for the reasons
given above), we feel no pressing need to defend MURIC*. Nonetheless, it is being
saddledwith another’s guilt. Is it true that every twomembers of the set of rest slices
bear the “appropriate sort of immanent causal relation” to each other? Surely (the
contents of)43 Resti and Rest f are not immanently causally related, since they lie on
opposite sides of a causal discontinuity! Gilmore thinks that Resti and Rest f are so
related because he explicitly assumes that “the relevant immanent causal relation is
transitive” (forthcoming, §4.1); and because (for some appropriately chosen para-
metrization by the real numbers of the parallel slices running from Resti to Rest f )
Restn is very plausibly immanently causally related to Restn+1 for all n (even within
the region of causal discontinuity).44
It is the transitivity assumption, and notMURIC*, that is to blame here. Indeed
this assumption even troubles MURIC itself. On the basis of transitivity Gilmore
explicitly conceded that any two rest-frame slices are immanently causally related
to each other. Resti and Rest f are therefore immanent-causally related; and so even
according to MURIC, their contents may be identied. We take this to be a reductio
of the transitivity claim.
Transitivity also causes diculties for the less liberal forms of relativistic en-
durantism that Gilmore considers a er rejecting ESP (see p. 28 above). Any causal
discontinuity not parallel to the permitted object-containing slices of a worldtube
gives rise to the very same problem.
Indeed, the combination of transitivity and near-instantaneous ‘immaculate re-
placement’ raises the same issues even in the non-relativistic case. Suppose that
horizontal lines in Fig. 3 represent planes of absolute simultaneity. Any two suc-
cessive simultaneity slices through theworldtube in questionwould be immanently
causally related. By transitivity then, Resti andRest f are again immanently casually
related, and no MURIC-like principle will prevent us from identifying them.
42MURIC and MURIC* only place necessary conditions on when the occupiers of two regions
may be regarded as one and the same, so should not putative counterexamples involve cases where
we want to say two such occupiers are the same despite MURIC(*) vetoing this? ¿e case under
discussion involves exactly the reverse. Gilmore is right to see it as problematic, however, for the
lack of appropriate casual connection between them is the only thing preventing our regarding the
occupiers of R1 and R2 as the same, and hence it is down to MURIC(*) to rule out their identity.
43N.B. that in what follows we occasionally omit this qualication.
44Within this region, only a single particle is ever non-causally replaced from one rest slice to the
next. Since, as Gilmore points out, we do allow that objects can persist through the gain and loss of
parts, such slices “are as intimately causally related as any two slices through a spatially extended,
persisting thing ever are” (forthcoming, §4.1).
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¿e most obvious moral here is that the relevant immanent causal relation is
not transitive. Recognizing this is the only way to uphold what should be an uncon-
troversial truth: that objects that are causally isolated from each other are not im-
manently causally related. Admittedly, the endurantist has a problem if they think
that immanent causal relations are sucient for identity. If this were the case then
the fact that immanent causal relations hold between any two successive rest slices
would make each such slice identical to the next. By the transitivity of identity,
we could then conclude that all such rest slices—including Resti and Rest f—are
identical.
¿e endurantist must therefore deny that being immanently causally related
is sucient for identity.45 Somewhere along the chain of (pairwise) immanently
causally related slices, identity is lost: there are (at least) two such successive slices
that do not contain the very same object. ¿is will be because, to put it in rough
terms, ‘too much’ of the object has by this stage been replaced ‘too quickly’. True:
in a dierent context these two slices might contain the very same object. But that
is just to say that identity can fail to hold as a result of accumulated changes. We
do not nd this entirely implausible, but the more relevant point is that, however
the endurantist deals with non-instantaneous causal discontinuities, they are not a
specically relativistic problem.
Gilmore’s second criticism of ESP concerns time-traveling impenetrable ex-
tended simples (forthcoming, §4.1).46 Consider again the worldtube of Fig. 2, in-
terpreted now as that of an impenetrable extended simple. According to ESP, the
object in question is located in very many subregions of that worldtube that over-
lap each other. Ra and Rb are examples (overlapping only at a two-dimensional
region). But in that case these objects do interpenetrate a er all!
Gilmore’s immediate riposte in defence of ESP is that Ra and Rb contain the
same object. Allowing such self -penetration is consistent with denying that any
two distinct objects can interpenetrate. ¿is response need not have a hint of ‘magic
physics’ about it (how does the object ‘know’ that it is only with itself that it is al-
lowed to interpenetrate?) because, for extended objects that are not simples at least,
‘self-penetration’ is really overlap, not interpenetration. ESP in noway suggests that
any region of theworldtube of an object is occupied bymatter twice over. ¿e occu-
45If it is analytic that immanent causal relations hold only between states of the same object then
we rephrase in terms of quasi-immanent causal relations: relations that are intrinsically identical
to bona de immanent causal relations except that they need not be accompanied by identity. ¿e
example in the main text illustrates how this might arise.
46It would bewrong for the defender of ESP to respond to this by simply refusing to beworried by
any problem that arises only in such a recherché scenario. We have clear intuitions about time travel
and interpenetration, both of which are respectable from the perspective of relativistic physics.
While we may not have such good intuitions about extended simples, some speculative physics
(viz. string theory) takes them seriously.
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pants of Ra and Rb (for example) share a part, and so do not interpenetrate, in just
the way that the central third of a desk shares a part with (but does not penetrate)
the le -hand half of the desk. Gilmore’s objects are simples though; they have no
parts to share. But must the defender of ESP therefore allow that self-penetration
occurs? Are regions of the worldtube of an extended simple persisting as per ESP
multiply occupied by matter? If not, can we not still maintain that here we have
overlap and not interpenetration?
Nomatter how one deals with the initial set-up, it is the next cycle of Gilmore’s
objection that he takes to spell trouble for ESP. Suppose that our simple’s path ex-
tends around a closed time-like loop so that, in some region of spacetime, the ob-
ject is on a collision course with its earlier self. ¿e intuitive expectation is that
the simple would not self-penetrate. But how can we uphold this given the earlier
concession that our simple can self-penetrate?
We do not see why an answer is supposed to be dicult to give. If a world
contains extended simples that do not interpenetrate, then (assuming the world is
law-governed) it will, for example, be the existence of certain powerful short-range
forces that ground non-penetration. ¿e law will ensure that if two occupied dis-
joint subregions of some global spacelike surface S through spacetime are within
some minimum distance from one another, then the pairs of subregions of space-
like hypersurfaces to the immediate future of S that are occupied by the same sim-
ples will be more distant from one another. ¿e law will be oblivious to whether it
is the same object occupying such pairs of regions or not, and it is entirely consis-
tent with the kind of overlap required by ESP, which only ever involves occupation
by the same object of two regions that do not both lie on some spacelike hyper-
surface. On the other hand, if the world is not law-governed, then the pattern of
multi-location exemplied by our simples will be just a matter of brute fact. But
then there is no reason why this brute fact should not be both consistent with ESP
and involve no worldlines that intersect themselves.
We therefore reject Gilmore’s second objection to ESP. But we oer a helping
hand.47 Suppose that our time-traveling object can penetrate other objects of its
type (including itself).48 Fig. 4 depicts the situation we have in mind; the diagonal
worldtube is the time-traveled continuation of the vertical one.
In this case ESP is in a pickle. Consider EF and GH. Intuitively, the time-
traveling object does not exactly occupy the fusion of EF and GH, but ESP threat-
ens to yield the opposite result since this fusion is amaximal achronal slice through
the object’s worldtube.49 Our intuition is even rmer that the object does exactly
47¿anks to John Hawthorne here.
48In this re-worked example our object, though still extended, need not be a simple.
49¿emere fact that EF and GH are not contiguous should not by itself be held to rule out their
exactly containing a single object, for many (perhaps most) objects do exactly occupy such regions
(suits and football teams etc., but perhaps alsomany less ‘dispersed’ objects for, e.g., inter-molecular
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Figure 4
occupy EF and (separately) GH. But since neither of these regions is a maximal
achronal slice through the object’s worldtube, ESP denies this.50
¿e alert reader will object that the fusion of EF and GH is not in fact achronal;
the existence of timelike loops means that EF is in the absolute future of GH (and
vice versa). ¿is fact secures the intuitively desirable result in this case: our time-
traveling object exactly occupies both EF and GH (assuming that each region by
itself intersects no timelike curve more than once) but not their fusion. Gilmore,
however, cannot oer this response, for he denes ESP in terms of a “local” sense
of achronal according to which EF and GH are achronal. (For details, the reader
is referred to Gilmore forthcoming, §2, fn 19; §4.1, fn 33.) But nor should he, for
abandoning the local sense of achronal for the global only courts other diculties.
For example, an object might not time travel itself, but might nonetheless exactly
occupy a region containing points that are timelike-separated due to an ‘almost
closed’ timelike curve (Gilmore forthcoming, §2, fn 19). ESP formulated in terms
of the global sense of achronal prohibits this.
¿e moral is that ESP is in diculty. Rather than oer yet another principled
answer toGilmore’s location question, however, we instead advocate a point of view
according to which the question itself is undercut. Since this viewpoint helps to an-
swerGilmore’s nal objection to ESP (i.e. his rst objection), we give a brief account
of this.
distances can be much greater than molecular widths).
50In fact, Gilmore notes (but does not solve) what is eectively a non-relativistic version of this
problem (forthcoming, §4, fn 29).
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(a) (b)
Figure 5
In fact it is this objection that leads to the requirement of maximality in ESP.
Consider the worldtube in Fig. 5a, and in particular the (achronal) subregion PQ.
ESP without the maximality requirement would rule that the object whose world-
tube is depicted does exactly occupy PQ. But this answer becomes impossible to
credit when we consider similar regions that are closer still to the top le -hand
corner of the worldtube. In the most extreme case, such a region might contain
only a single particle. Surely the object does not exactly occupy this region.51
Gilmore’s solution is to note that PQ, rather like ST, is not amaximal achronal
regionwithin the worldtube; it is a subregionofmany larger achronal regions, PQR
for example.
We are not at all sure this that is the wrong response, but one might worry that
it goes too far. Consider the region UV in Fig. 5b. Supposing the worldtube to be
that of a human, this region might contain all the usual parts of a person except
for a right hand. Should one say that such a slice does not contain the person in
question? If instead we consider someone who loses a hand, ESP (subsequently)
locates that person at just such a slice.
Our discussion of the time travel and corner slice objections to ESP has revealed
that it does have problems. ¿e root of these problems, however, does not lie with
the details of ESP. We see no reason to suppose that any attempt to provide an
answer to Gilmore’s Location Question will be successful if that answer is meant to
be applicable to all types of object, especially if the answer further restricts itself to
51Miller raises the same diculty (2004, 365-6).
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characterizing the objects’ locations in purely spatiotemporal terms (as ESP does).
On the approach we prefer, the endurantist proceeds on a case-by-case, region-
by-region basis, so that whether an object exactly occupies a region depends criti-
cally on the type of object being considered. ¿e endurantist believes that objects
are three-dimensional and exactly occupymultiple spacetime regions. But the pre-
cise locations of such an object are not determined by the fact that some spacetime
region contains its worldtube and that certain subregions of this region satisfy cer-
tain geometric constraints. It is, of course, the other way around. Facts aboutwhere
the object is located determine which region is its worldtube. ¿is might be as true
for point particles as for composite objects; some facts about where a particle is
located, together with causal laws, will determine that the particle is also located in
certain other point-sized regions.
For composite objects, bedrock is the pattern of (multiple) location of the fun-
damental entities that, at various spacetime regions, compose them. Some three-
dimensional achronal regions will contain the right sorts of such entities, arranged
in the appropriate way, for these entities to compose a particular type of object at
that region. We thus arrive at three-dimensional objects. In general, whether a
given three-dimensional region contains an object of a given type will not just be a
matter of the intrinsic character of the contents of that region. It will also depend
on regions to its past and future having the right kind of content.52 And it will also
depend on regions that are spacelike related to it having the right kind of content
(statue shaped regions within blocks of marble are not statues).53
¿is gives us variously located three-dimensional objects. But some of these
‘objects’ are the very same object. Such identity facts will be determined by a mix-
ture of spatiotemporal and causal considerations; but, just as with composition, the
precise detailsmay be expected to vary fromkind to kind and fromobject to object.
In any case, it is only at this late stage that the identications that determine an en-
during object’s worldtube enter the picture. We only arrive at the path of an object
of a certain type by rst determining which three-dimensional regions contain ob-
jects of that type and then by determining which regions contain the same object.
We then take the union of a set of such regions. But if the path is arrived at in this
way, which locations within it are occupied by its object cannot be an interesting
question that remains outstanding. We already know the answer.
52Cf. Sider (2001, 187–8).
53It is this type of consideration that gives the maximality requirement in ESP whatever plausi-
bility it has, particularly in regard to the region ST in Fig. 5a.
37
6 Balashov on Explanatory Deciency
Finally, we return to Yuri Balashov. In addition to the considerations discussed in
Section 3, Balashov has presented a further argument against endurantism. His
conclusion in its most general form is that, especially in comparison with perdu-
rantism, endurantism is an explanatorily inadequate theory of persistence.54
What are the data to be explained? Balashov contends that one and the same
persisting object exhibits a vast array of dierent three-dimensional shapes that all
t together into a smooth four-dimensional volume. According the Balashov, the
perdurantist can easily explain this fact. For the endurantist, however, it remains a
complete mystery (Balashov 1999, 651–3; 2000b, 333–4).
Of course in relativity when we say that an object exhibits a great variety of
shapes this should not be understood in terms of variety over time. Rather Bal-
ashov suggests that shapes (and properties more generally) are doubly-indexed to
both a frame and a time. Purportedly enduring objects then exhibit a multitude of
such doubly-indexed shapes which, to repeat, “arrange themselves into a ‘nice’ 4D
volume in space-time” (Balashov 2000b, 334).
¿is is not even the worst of it. Balashov writes that “a series of pictures of
a single object taken from the same place at the same time” will, in certain cir-
cumstances, show the object as dierently-shaped. How bizarre! But the situation
he envisages involves momentarily coincident observers traveling at dierent ve-
locities. According to relativity (says Balashov), in “dierent such perspectives an
object presents itself in dierent shapes” (1999, 652).
Regarding these most recent claims, Balashov explicitly admits that talk of ob-
servers and their pictures should not be taken literally; he is interested “not with
the subjective appearance of objects but with the way they are in and of themselves”
(1999, 660, fn 5). ¿is disclaimer is sorely needed though, since any snapshots
taken by observers at the same spacetime point would in fact be exactly the same—
whatever their relative velocities!55
We therefore take Balashov’s ultimate claim, stripped of its observational garb,
merely to be that objects are dierent ways relative to two frames with respect to
which two observers in relative motion are at rest. ¿e fact that such observers
maymomentarily coincide adds nothing. Of course, the frame-relativized facts in-
54Balashov proceeds to this conclusion in two separate papers from two rather dierent starting
points. In one he starts from a discussion of a two-dimensional spatial world (“Flatland”) that is
embedded in a three-dimensional space containing spatially three-dimensional objects (Balashov
1999). Right-thinking Flatlanders reason abductively to the conclusion that their objects are spa-
tially three-dimensional; Balashov thinks this parallels the (this worldly) argument for perduran-
tism that we will soon discuss. In a second paper he attempts to illustrate the same line of thought
using the traditional relativistic ‘problem’ of the Pole and the Barn (Balashov 2000b).
55Any and all light arriving at a point (P) emanates from just those points in P’s backwards light-
cone. ¿e velocity of any observer at P is entirely irrelevant.
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volved here should not be given undue weight. ¿emore fundamental facts for the
endurantist concern the shapes of an object’s multiple locations. Relative to a par-
ticular frame, the object’s shape is given by the shape of its locations containing only
points that are simultaneous in that frame. So reduced, we nd the phenomenon
to which Balashov draws attention less sensational than originally expected.
What about the major explanandum though? One and the same object pos-
sesses what for Balashov is a vast array of frame-and-time-relativized shapes.
All these 3D shapes taken together exhibit a remarkably unity: they
can be lined up neatly in spacetime to ll a nice 4D volume, without
‘corrugation’ and ‘dents’. How would the endurantist explain this unity
among the 3D shapes? (Balashov 2000b, 334)
How indeed? Let us start with the non-relativistic case; there too the successive
shapes of an enduring object aggregate up into smooth four-dimensional spacetime
volumes.56 But in this case the explanation is clear: a causal story accounts for the
shape of an object’s worldtube.57 If one overeats, one’s worldtube soon thickens. If
one diets, it all-too-gradually narrows.
Miller makes this very point in response to Balashov:
Various causal facts about an enduring object O at time t, make it the
case that O will exist at t. So there is no explanatory mystery here.
(Miller 2004, 367)
Later on:
[W]e take as basic the three-dimensional objects and use the various
‘rules’ in the form of the laws of nature to predict what those objects
will be like in the future. So it can hardly come as a surprise when we
discover that those objects ll nice four-dimensional volumes: for that
is precisely what we predicted, given our theory. (Miller 2004, 368)
We approve of this causal strategy. However, whilst Miller’s remarks are en-
tirely appropriate in the non-relativistic case, she is inexplicit as to how to alter
the story—or even whether it needs altering—to deal with relativity. Interpreted
56Although Miller (2004, 367) makes the nice point that on mereological universalism most
worldtubes are anything but smooth or nice. Balashov’s claim is nonetheless broadly true for ‘every-
day’ objects, although we should bear in mind that trees get pruned, watches disassembled, etc.
57Weshall soon see thatMiller (2004)makes this point. In addition it corresponds to an objection
by Hud Hudson in the context of Balashov’s Flatland. We agree with Balashov that the objection
fails in that context, but Balashov goes on to mistakenly reject the relativistic analogue (1999, 660,
fn 3).
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relativistically, her causal story must be taken as frame-relative (witness the un-
qualied talk of times). ¿ere is the standard worry about the propriety of frame-
relativization here, but in addition there is the new concern that such a causal story
will privilege the frame in which it is told in a manner inconsistent with relativity.
One might respond that the causal story can be given relative to any frame, and
thus no frame is privileged. But suppose that, as is natural to interpret Miller, the
causal goings-on in frame A are used to generate the successive shapes and prop-
erties of an object in that frame. What of the shapes and properties of the object
in frame B? Perhaps these are to be derived from the successive shapes and prop-
erties in A, or (equivalently) from the object’s worldtube as generated in A. But
when, in the spirit of relativity, we also assert that the causal goings-on in B could
have grounded matters, we surely risk undermining our explanation. How can the
goings-on in A account for the shapes in B when the shapes in A are themselves
accounted for by the goings-on in B? Does this not mean that neither frame tells
the fundamental story?
We shall therefore amend this causal account. Sider (2001, 82–3) provides the
basic idea when he suggests in response to Balashov that the endurantist begin by
focusing on the parts of an object—and in particular its constituent particles.58 He
continues:
Provided the endurantist can make sense of the part-whole relation in
a relativistic context, then, she can account for the shapes of macro-
scopic objects in various reference frames. (Sider 2001, 83)
Balashov was aware of Sider’s then-unpublished suggestion; his discussion in-
cludes a preemptive riposte. ¿e kernel of this is that “instead of oering a real ex-
planans. . . the move, in eect, boils down to restating the explanandum” (Balashov
1999, 655). How so?
Chemical explosions, the second law of thermodynamics and superconduc-
tivity are all adduced to articulate Balashov’s point; but the central claim is clear
enough. Why does an object, O, move from A to B? Answer: because its con-
stituent particles take that path. Balashov would rightly claim that this just restates
the explanandum. ¿at O moves from A to B is tantamount to its particles do-
ing the same. Of course if we somehow explain the one fact then, given certain
facts about composition, we explain the other; but neither fact by itself explains
the other. ¿ey are two sides of the very same coin.
58To engage with Sider and (later) Balashov, we speak as if objects were fundamentally consti-
tuted by particles. We intend no commitment to a fundamentally particulate ontology by this.
Endurantism may be threatened by the fact that our best physical theories of matter are (relativis-
tic) quantum eld theories. But if this is indeed so, it is not a specically relativistic problem for
endurantism, and so not a topic for this paper.
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¿is response rests on amisunderstanding. We grant that the spacetime path of
an object involves little if anything more than the combined spacetime paths of its
constituent particles. Nonetheless, the point of re-stating the explanandum at the
particulate level (and, to clarify, we concede that it is amere re-statement) is that we
can then give a genuine explanation of the re-stated facts. ¿is genuine explanation
does not just amount to, as Balashov puts it, “putting [a] nger on the worldlines
of such particles to nd out what space-time point is occupied by what particle”
(1999, 654). It rather requires us to saywhy a particle at one spacetime point is also
at this adjacent spacetime point rather than this one; and such a story will be told
in terms of physics. ¿e various local elds around a particle determine where it
‘next’ is; such elds again determine where it is ‘a er’ that; and so on until we have
the complete worldline.59 ¿e same considerations determine the worldlines of all
of an object’s particles, and thus they ultimately account for its four-dimensional
career.
Of course in everyday contexts we rarely consider such particulate explana-
tions. But we saw a disadvantage to more macroscopic causal accounts: in which
frame is themacroscopic story to be told? An advantage of the particulate explana-
tion—and this is a point that Sider misses—is that the explanation of the particle
worldlines can easily be stated in terms of a frame-free physics, and thus we can
avoid even the appearance of a clash with relativity.
To repeat then, it is physical law that explains why a particle follows the world-
line it does; this depends on the elds local to it. Similar facts explain theworldlines
of nearby particles, leaving us with a fully-grounded four-dimensional ‘sheaf ’. If
this sheaf is ‘smooth’ or ‘nice’ then this is because the trajectories of particles within
material objects are constrained by physical law to remain in stable congurations.
No endurantist magic is required. As for the endurantist’s three-dimensional ob-
jects, these enter the picture via facts about composition. Once we have our story
as to why the particles do what they do, compositional considerations of the sort
outlined at the end of Section 5 licence the endurantist to re-state these micro-
scopic facts in macroscopic, three-dimensional terms.60 Small wonder, then, that
the three-dimensional object-shapes thus derived coalesce into a smooth four-
dimensional whole. ¿ey are each composed of constituent particles at dierent
points along their worldlines; and considerations from physics ensure that, in the
case of familiar objects, these worldlines are closely associated into a smooth vol-
ume.
Finally, we must comment on the perdurantist’s predicament. Although per-
during objects of course have a single four-dimensional shape, it seems just as true
59¿e scare quotes indicate that the relativistic endurantist should really eschew such temporal
talk; but they are free to re-cast the point using exact occupation of spacetime regions.
60¿at this is indeed a re-statement was of course Balashov’s earlier complaint.
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for perdurance as for endurance that such objects are ‘associated’ with a multitude
of dierent three-dimensional shapes.
Such three-dimensional shapes still aggregate into smooth four-dimensional
world-volumes. According to Balashov,
the four-dimensionalist has a ready and natural explanation of the this
fact: dierent 3D shapes are cross-sections of a single 4D entity. . . (1999,
653; our emphasis)
Similarly:
¿e explanation is that one is dealing with a 4D object presenting its
various 3D parts. . . (1999, 653; our emphasis)
We agree that if objects perdure then the three-dimensional shapes are cross-
sections through those four-dimensional objects. ¿e question, though, is whether
Balashov is entitled to simply assume the existence and shape of four-dimensional
objects, only for this to then ground facts about the three-dimensional parts. Bal-
ashov thinks this is right and proper, claiming that “such parts are ‘carved out’ from
a pre-existing ontological entity. . . ” (2000b, 333). Yet there is no obvious sense in
which the four-dimensional entity “pre-exists”.61
Wealso take issuewithBalashov’s comment that the “facts about the occupation
of 4D volumes by perduring objects are fundamental and irreducible to the facts
about themereological relations between four-dimensional wholes and their three-
dimensional parts” (2000b, 323). It ismisguided to think perduring objects are sim-
ply given. In fact this is no more true of perduring objects than of enduring ones;
and the reason is the same in both cases. Put in terms of perdurance, objects have
their four-dimensional shapes in virtue of their ultimate constituents. ¿ese, still
according to perdurance, are extremely thin, tube-shaped four-dimensional enti-
ties; but what again determines the twists and turns of such tubes is local physics,
which can be given a frame-free formulation. ¿e locations of successive temporal
parts of the perduring constituents are thus grounded; and withinmaterial objects,
constituent worldtubes tend to coalesce. Hence we again explain the ‘smooth’ four-
dimensional volume, with its three-dimensional cross-sections. As with endurance
though, it is facts at the microscopic level that provide the ultimate explanation for
three-dimensional shapes—whether these are grounded directly by such facts, or
whether this proceeds indirectly through a similarly-grounded four-dimensional
entity.62
61Balashov uses the same terminology elsewhere (1999, 654–6).
62For discussion of material related to this paper, we are grateful to Yuri Balashov, Jeremy But-
tereld, Bill Child, Cody Gilmore, John Hawthorne, Nick Huggett, Eleanor Knox, James Ladyman,
Brain Le ow, ¿omas Sattig, Simon Saunders, Steve Weinstein, the Oxford philosophy of physics
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